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Abstract 
We consider whether the impact of entrepreneurial orientation on business performance is 
moderated by the company affiliation with business groups. Within business groups, we 
explore the trade-off between inter-firm insurance that enables risk-taking, and inefficient 
resource allocation. Risk-taking in group affiliated firms leads to higher performance, 
compared to independent firms, but the impact of proactivity is attenuated. Utilising Indian 
data, we show that risk-taking may undermine rather than improve business performance, but 
this effect is not present in business groups. Proactivity enhances performance, but less so in 
business groups. Firms can also enhance performance by technological knowledge 
acquisition, but these effects are not significantly different for various ownership categories. 
   
Keywords: emerging economies; business groups; entrepreneurial orientation; India 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is stylized that institutional voids in emerging market economies affect, among other 
things, ownership and organisational structures of firms (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Morck 
and Yeung, 2003). In particular, greater transactions cost of contract enforcement have 
resulted in a high share of family firms even among the larger corporations, and in significant 
concentration of shares in the hands of families and/or key shareholders (Bhaumik and 
Dimova, 2014). In addition, a large proportion of these firms belong to wider business 
networks and in many contexts state-ownership continues to play a significant role 
(Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Gedaljovic and Shapiro, 1998; Peng and Delios, 2006). To a 
considerable extent, emergence and persistence of these ownership forms ± in particular, 
business groups ± is on account of capital market imperfections that can generally be traced 
back to low levels of investor and creditor protection. The latter also implies that existing 
firms with internal accruals are in a better position to expand, or diversify into new business 
ventures (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Riyanto and Toolsema, 2008).  
Business groups have long been of interest to researchers because of their dominant 
positions in emerging market economies; for example, large and successful conglomerates 
are ubiquitous in East and South Asia (Carney, Gedalovic, Huegens, Van Essen, and Van 
Ousterhaut, 2011). Extant enquiry has largely focussed on two different aspects of business 
groups, namely, the impact of business group affiliation on firm performance and the 
implications of business group affiliation for corporate governance of these firms (Khanna 
and Yafeh, 2007; Estrin, Poukliakova and Shapiro, 2008). It has been argued, for example, 
that business group affiliation miJKWSRVLWLYHO\FRQWULEXWHWRDILUP¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDQGPDUNHW
value, especially in contexts where capital and factor markets remain imperfect (Keister, 
1998; Khanna, 2000), and that the benefits of business group affiliation can be higher if the 
group is well diversified (Khanna and Palepu, 1999). The research on corporate governance 
Page 4 of 57 
 
has explored the opacity of ownership structures that can be traced back to mechanisms such 
as the cross-holding of shares among affiliated firms (Weidenbaum, 1996; Bebchuk 
Kraakman and Triantis, 2000), and the use of internal capital markets and other mechanisms 
to tunnel financial resources from one set of business group affiliated firms to another 
(Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan, 2002). Thus, while business groups often exhibit weak 
corporate governance, their existence has been seen to be an effective response to 
institutional weaknesses/voids in emerging market economies, thereby generating some 
competitive advantage for member firms as against firms that are unaffiliated.  
Over the past two decades, however, emerging market economies have experienced 
significant changes in their economic and institutional environments (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau 
and Wright, 2000; Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Obloj, 2007). There was a noticeable improvement 
in the ease of contract enforcement and, more generally, the ease of doing business in a large 
number of these economies (O¶Neil, 2011). For example, the 2012 Doing Business report of 
WKH:RUOG%DQNFRQFOXGHGWKDW³PRUH and more economies are focusing their reform efforts 
on strengthening legal institutions such as courts and insolvency regimes and enhancing legal 
protections of investors and property rights. This shift has been particularly pronounced in 
low- and lower-middle-income economies where 43% of all reforms recorded by Doing 
Business in 2010/11 focused on aspects captured by the getting credit, protecting investors, 
HQIRUFLQJFRQWUDFWVDQGUHVROYLQJLQVROYHQF\LQGLFDWRUV´SS There has also been a 
considerable deepening of financial sectors in these countries and convergence in financial 
development between less and more developed emerging market economies (Krishnan, 2011; 
Dekle and Pundit, 2016). Thus, arguments for the existence of business groups based on the 
market imperfections and institutional weaknesses are slowly ORVLQJWKHLUUDLVRQG¶HWUH. But, 
even though there has been some efficiency-driven consolidation of firms within and across 
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business groups (Carney, Estrin, Shapiro and Van Essen, 2015), we have not observed the 
dissolution of (or a significant reduction in number of) business groups..  
This raises the issue of whether, and in which ways, the business group structure 
continues to be efficient in the current emerging market context. In this paper, we go beyond 
the simple impact of business groups on firm performance, to consider how affiliation affects 
the ways in which business strategy - specifically concerning innovation, risk taking and 
proactiveness, as summarised by the construct entrepreneurial orientation (EO) - is translated 
into firm performance. While the impact of business group affiliation is the focus of our 
inquiry, we also consider similar effects for other ownership structures than domestic 
business groups, namely firms affiliated with a foreign multinational, state owned, or those 
remaining independent of business group structures (either domestic or foreign).  
Strategic decision making within business groups may be facilitated by structures 
which allow scarce managerial capabilities to be used to their full potential within the group. 
Moreover, because information flows are greater within business groups, the uncertainty 
associated with investment and production decisions may be reduced (Carney, 2008; Steier, 
2009). Business groups provide an institutional structure within which risks can be shared 
and mitigated by the flow of resources across affiliated firms via internal capital markets 
(Khana and Yafeh, 2005). This implicit insurance increases the ability of affiliated firms to 
bear the risks that are an integral component of business strategy. However, these risk 
mitigation mechanisms may also adversely affect the quality of decision making within 
business groups, leading managers to seek internal rents rather than to innovate (Fogel, 2006; 
Morck & Yeung, 2004; Carney, 2008). Moreover, innovation within business group affiliates 
may also be negatively affected by other factors such as group diversification (Chang, Chung 
& Mahmood, 2006). Our argument therefore centres on the trade-off between the mutual 
insurance that enhances the ability of member firms in business groups to take risks (by 
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enabling affiliate survival even in the event of business failure), and the inefficiencies in 
resource allocation which blunt managerial incentives. 
There has been little prior research about the impact of business group affiliation in 
emerging markets on risk taking and proactiveness, while, unlike for developed economies 
(Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010), the evidence about the impact on innovation is mixed. On 
the one hand, it has been argued that group affiliated firms are likely to be more innovative 
than their competitors in contexts where institutions are weak (Chang, Chung and Mahmood, 
2006; Choi, Lee and Williams, 2011), i.e. where the benefits from mutual insurance or 
internal resource sharing are high. On the other hand, empirical evidence suggests that while 
business groups may initially have an advantage over these competitors with respect to 
technological progress and productivity growth, this advantage disappears rapidly as the 
institutional context improves (Bhaumik and Zhou, 2014).  
In this paper, therefore, we explore how business group affiliation and also alternative 
ownership structures modify the impact of the components of ILUP¶VVWUDWHJLF(2RQLWV
performance. In doing so, we extend the line of inquiry that examines the implications of the 
impact of ownership concentration and identity of owners on firm performance (Gedajlovic 
and Shapiro, 1998; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Specifically, we make three significant 
contributions to the literature. First, we extend the use of the construct of EO strategy to the 
emerging market context where the impact of risk taking, proactivity, and innovation can be 
quite different. Second we theorise about the way in which ownership identity affects the 
effectiveness with which these strategies are translated into firm performance. This, in turn, 
enables us to draw implications about the efficacy of persistence of ownership (and 
organisational) structures such as business groups in contexts where institutional weaknesses 
and voids are being reduced. Finally, we provide empirical evidence from an emerging 
market about the moderating effects of ownership on the relationship between firm strategies 
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and performance across a range of categories that include business groups, state-owned and 
foreign-owned enterprises. 
The specific context of our empirical analysis is India, where business groups are 
common, but unaffiliated (independent) private firms are also present in large numbers.  
Since the 1950s, industrial policy in India was characterized by government control over 
financial and other key resources, protection against competition from imports, and the so-
called licence raj that provided incumbent large firms with protection from competition 
(Khanna, 2011). In 1991, the Indian government ushered in an era of pro-competition reforms 
(Douma, George & Kabir, 2006) that led to the gradual dismantling of the dysfunctional 
regulation, together with greater autonomy for the (still mostly state-owned) banks (Bhaumik 
& Dimova, 2004), and the development of a modern, competitive capital market from 1994 
onwards (Khanna, 2011). As a consequence, the emphasis of business strategy has shifted 
from investment in institutional relatedness that offered advantages with respect to access to 
scarce resources (Peng, Lee & Wang, 2005; Peng, 2006) to greater focus on value-enhancing 
strategies (Kedia, Mukherjee & Lahiri, 2006). The Indian post-liberalisation context therefore 
is ideally suited for an examination of the optimality of business groups and their affiliated 
firms in a changing post-reform institutional environment. At the same time, it permits a 
meaningful analysis involving EO components understood as managerial strategies, and a 
comparison of the impact of EO on performance of business group affiliates, independent 
private firms, and those with other ownership structures. 
Our results suggest that business group affiliated firms in emerging economies manage 
risk better relative to their independent counterparts: whilst the performance of independent 
firms declines with greater risk-taking, while-that of group affiliated firms is either 
unaffected b\RUSRVLWLYHO\LQIOXHQFHG+HQFHEXVLQHVVJURXSDIILOLDWLRQLQFUHDVHVWKHILUP¶V
ability to assume risks by weakening the detrimental impact of risk-taking on enterprise 
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performance. At the same time, the relationship between retained earnings ± our measure of 
proactiveness ± DQGILUP¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLVZHDNHUIRUEXVLQHVVJURXSDIILOLDWHVWKDQIRUWKHLU
independent peers, suggesting that the return on internal resources is lower for the former 
than for the latter. Thus we find evidence of a trade-off between the ability to take risk and a 
misallocation of resources resulting from business group affiliation.  Finally, we find that 
firmV¶ performance is significantly and positively affected by knowledge acquisition in India, 
but we cannot identify any differences in this respect between group affiliated, independent 
and other types of firms.  
 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION (EO) STRATEGIES IN AN 
EMERGING MARKET CONTEXT  
Strategic decisions within the firm relate to a wide range of activities such as planning, 
organizational decision-making processes, and strategic management (Hart, 1992; 
Rajagopalan, Rasheed & Datta, 1993).  In this context, the strategy literature on developed 
economies has drawn extensively on the construct of entrepreneurial orientation, EO. In the 
developed economy literature, EO incorporates three pillars, namely, risk-taking, pro-
activeness and innovativeness (Covin & Slevin, 1989).1 We propose that the latter is also 
relevant for firms in emerging markets, capturing these generic features of  innovation, risk-
taking and pro-active investment in new activities.2 Lumpkin and Dess (1996) define EO as a 
"fundamental set of strategy-making processes" (pp. 139) and stylize an entrepreneurial firm 
as one which "engages in product market innovation, undertakes somewhat risky ventures, 
                                                          
1
,EO represents a dimension of corporate strategy that can apply to firms or business units (Wales, Monsen & 
McKelvie, 2011), and can depend on the structure of the firm (Covin & Slevin, 1989) as well as on factors such 
as the personality of the CEO (Begley & Boyd, 1987).   
2
 It has been argued that entirely new concepts will be required to understand business performance and 
especially entrepreneurship in emerging markets (see e.g. Bruton, Ahlstrom and Obloj (2008).  Our research 
strategy entails modifying the existing construct with respect to knowledge, and also proposing modified, 
developing economy context-specific measures for the other two components of EO, as explained below. 
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DQGLV«
SURDFWLYH
«EHDWLQJFRPSHWLWRUVWRWKHSXQFK0LOOHUSS(2 has 
become an influential model of strategy-making (Miller & Friesen, 1982; Covin & Slevin, 
1991) that has been directly linked to firm performance (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). In 
developed countries, the aforementioned three pillars have each been found to have a positive 
effect on corporate performance (Miller, 1983; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011).3 However, 
this may not be the case in emerging economies, and moreover the EO-performance link may 
be quite different for firms affiliated with business groups as against unaffiliated firms or 
other ownership types.  
In particular, while all three dimensions of EO DUHDUJXHGWRHQKDQFHILUP¶V
performance in developed economies, in emerging economy contexts their impact may be 
different because of institutional voids, such as the absence of insurance markets to hedge 
against risk.4 Indeed, Lumpkin and Dess (1996) have suggested that "[t]he dimensions of an 
entrepreneurial orientation ... may vary independently of each other in a given context" (ibid., 
pp. 151), and that the impact of EO on performance itself is context specific. This leads us to 
discuss the impact of each of the dimensions of EO on firm performance in emerging 
economies separately. 
 
Risk taking and proactiveness  
                                                          
3
 Following Miller (1983), it is conventional to create a composite index of EO from these three dimensions 
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011). However, combining these into a single indicator is only feasible 
FRQFHSWXDOO\LIWKH\HDFKKDYHVLPLODULPSOLFDWLRQVIRUILUP¶VSHUIRUPDQFH. 
4
 According to KPMG (2013), for example, general insurance penetration (measured as ratio of premium to 
GDP, in percentage terms) is 1.2 in China and 0.7 in India, compared with 4.5 in the USA, 3.1 in the UK and 
3.6 in Germany (Exhibit 4A, pp. 18). Further, in India, auto insurance and health insurance account for 41% and 
22%, respectively, of the general insurance market, while fire and engineering risks account for 4% and 5%, 
UHVSHFWLYHO\RIWKHPDUNHW6LPLODUO\LQWKH5HVHUYH%DQNRI,QGLDQRWHGWKDW³>D@W\SLFDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFRI
the Indian interest rate market is that unlike in the overseas inter-bank funds markets, there is very little activity 
in tenors beyond overnight and as such there is no credible interest rate in segments other than overnight. 
Absence of   a liquid 3-month or 6-month funds market has been a hindrance for trading in FRAs as also in 
VZDSVEDVHGRQWKHVHEHQFKPDUNV´,QRWKHUZRUGVIirms in emerging markets such as India find it difficult (or 
expensive) to hedge against relevant operational and market risks. 
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We start with the proposition that business group affiliation may lead to be trade-offs 
between the first two elements of entrepreneurial orientation; risk-taking and proactiveness. 
Capital markets are severely imperfect in emerging economies, so internal accruals (self-
financing) are typically WKHGRPLQDQWVRXUFHRIILUPV¶LQYHVWPHQWILQDQFH.KDQQD	3DOHSX
1997).  Business groups are then an efficient response to the market failure, with internal 
capital markets extending finance opportunities and substituting for imperfect external capital 
markets (Riyanto & Toolsema, 2008). For example, investment by firms affiliated to Korean 
chaebols is sensitive not to their own cash flow, but to the cash flow of the business group as 
a whole (Shin & Park, 1999). Membership of business groups, and de facto access to cash 
flow of other group members, also facilitates access to external credit in contexts where the 
transaction costs associated with enforcing debt covenants is high (Ghatak & Kali, 2001; 
Friedman, Johnson & Mitton, 2003).  
However, reliance on internal rather than external capital markets may also have 
undesirable consequences. It is usually argued that business groups seek to maximize the 
joint profit of all affiliates (Aoki, 1984, 1988), but they may also suppress productive 
activities in some member firms to protect obsolete investment in others (Morck & Yeung, 
2003).5  Indeed, profits may be redistributed from stronger to weaker firms in the group 
(Estrin, Poukliakova & Shapiro, 2009), potentially reducing the efficiency with which 
internal resources are invested (Shin & Stulz, 1998). Thus, while business group membership 
offers insurance against various types of shocks, this protection comes at a cost, especially for 
the stronger firms within the groups; it can have adverse implications for performance and 
attenuate the incentives of affiliates. In addition, risk mitigation can create moral hazard, 
which may also affect firm performance adversely. For example, Chacar and Vissa (2005) 
find that Indian firms with business group affiliation exhibit greater persistence of poor 
                                                          
5
 Though except for the Japanese keiretsu system (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), there is little direct empirical 
evidence about mutual insurance. 
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performance than those without group affiliation. We therefore posit that while business 
groups offer insurance to their affiliates encouraging them to take risks, this comes at the cost 
of inefficiency in the allocation of financial resources. 
Extant research usually suggests that, in the context of institutional voids, the internal 
capital market of business groups may lead to improved firm performance (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Gedaljovic & Shapiro, 2002). We use the EO 
conceptualisation to refine the argument by distinguishing between two conflicting channels 
influencing the choices of managers of affiliate companies. On the one hand, by providing 
insurance against external risks, business group affiliation makes taking risks a more 
effective managerial strategy. On the other hand, internal redistribution within the business 
group has a negative impact on managerial incentives by breaking the link between 
accumulated surplus and performance. The risk-insurance element and the redistributive 
element cannot be represented as a simple trade-off because managers in each business group 
affiliate face a different set of business opportunities. For some affiliate firms, risk taking 
may be critical; for others, risks may be lower, but the capacity to follow aggressive 
investment strategies ahead of the rivals may be the decisive factor in performance.  
Now, comparing our analysis with the traditional developed economy story, we observe 
that risk-taking - the first strategic dimension of EO (Miller, 1983; Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2011) ± has been identified with the willingness of managers to act in a bold and 
decisive manner in the face of uncertainty. This can be reflected in actions such as mergers 
and acquisitions, risky product launches and entry into uncertain markets. While such 
strategies entail an increased probability of business failure, the existence of sophisticated 
capital markets allow for diversification of risk and hedging. The evidence suggests that such 
strategies do in fact improve company performance in developed economies.  However, in 
emerging economies these risks are exacerbated by missing insurance markets and high 
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transactions cost of hedging,6 which may hinder or prevent risk diversification (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2000). This means that while successful risk taking could in some circumstances still 
enhance performance in the manner envisaged in the EO literature, the mean effect of a risk 
taking strategy in emerging markets may instead be inferior performance as a consequence of 
ex ante credit rationing and unfavourable ex post refinancing. It may even lead to bankruptcy, 
or quasi-bankruptcy outcomes such as severe loss of liquidity and debt restructuring, in the 
event that the risk-taking decisions result in a bad outcome.  
This is also why, in the emerging market context, business groups that can use their 
internal capital market to provide their affiliated companies with a better mechanism to 
manage their risks can ameliorate the potential negative impact of risk-taking on firm 
performance despite the absence of suitable insurance markets. 7KHEXVLQHVVJURXSV¶DELOLW\
to insure member firms against adverse impact of risk taking, at least in part, is largely driven 
by the widespread use of diversification strategies across industries, and business and product 
lines (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). While the empirical evidence does not consistently confirm 
the universality of mutual support and insurance within business groups, evidence for such 
support is strong among Asian countries (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Gopalan, Nanda & Seru, 
2007). By contrast, independent private firms that are unaffiliated to business groups have to 
rely on those imperfect or absent insurance markets. These firms are likely to experience at a 
minimum a weaker positive relationship between risk-taking and performance and  given the 
lack of diversification and hedging opportunities, the risk-taking-performance relationship 
may in fact be negative for independent firms in emerging markets. Therefore, we can 
hypothesize the following: 
                                                          
6
 In India, for example, despite growth in the foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives market, "by global 
standards it is still in its nascent stage" (Gopinath, 2010, pp. 69). 
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Hypothesis 1: There will be a stronger positive (or weaker negative) link between risk 
taking and firm performance for business group affiliates, compared with independent 
private companies, in emerging economies.  
 
For developed economies, the impact of proactivity, the second EO strategic pillar, is 
based on the idea that firms which take investment opportunities early will perform better. 
Strategic advantages arise from investing resources internally to seize opportunities early in 
the marketplace, rather than returning profits to the owners. Firms in emerging markets face 
similar strategic rivalries as their counterparts in developed economies, and are positioned to 
reap similar benefits from the first mover advantages. In particular, proactive use of internal 
resources can be an advantage on account of the fact that credit and capital market frictions 
firms that do not use internal resources may find it difficult rapidly to take advantage of new 
investment opportunities. However, membership of business groups may exercise an 
attenuating influence on this relationship for two reasons; both related to the role played by 
business groups in insuring affiliated firms against the downsides of risk taking. First, the 
transfer of resources from more successful business group affiliates to less successful ones, 
arising as a result of the insurance function of business groups, will adversely affect the 
incentives of managers in affiliated firms. As we have already noted, available evidence 
suggests that the ability of a group-DIILOLDWHGILUP¶VPDQDJHUVWRLQYHVWGHSHQGVQRWRQLWV
own internal resources but those of the overall group (Shin & Park, 1999). For the more 
capable managers, this disincentive therefore occurs because if they are successful, they may 
lose the resulting additional resources to their less successful counterparts within the group. 
Second, unsuccessful or ineffective managers, who are insured against poor outcomes, are 
less motivated to succeed because they will receive resources regardless of what happens to 
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the performance of the firm (Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung, 2005). In light of these 
possibilities, we posit the following: 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a weaker positive link between retained earnings and firm 
performance for business group affiliates, compared with independent private companies, in 
emerging economies. 
 
Acquisition of knowledge 
Innovation is typically seen as a key driver of corporate performance in developed 
economies, and is the third pillar of EO (Miller, 1983). However, we follow Minniti and 
Lévesque (2010) in arguing that innovativeness is a dimension of entrepreneurial strategy 
that should be seen as context-specific; its significance for company performance will depend 
on the level of development of the economy under consideration. In particular, the impact of 
innovation on firm performance in emerging markets may be affected negatively by the 
limited institutional support for the generation of innovation (Cuervo-Cazurro and 
Ramamurti, 2014). Moreover, it is often argued that firms in emerging markets have a weaker 
ability to learn from new techniques and innovations as a consequence of lower levels of 
absorptive capacity to benefit from new techniques, methods and products (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001, Estrin, Meyer and Pelletier, 2016). 
Thus, while innovativeness is a critical dimension of entrepreneurship in mature market 
economies, it may be less so for firms that can make significant efficiency gains while still 
not operating on the technological frontier (Acemoglu, Aghion & Zilibotti, 2006). In the 
latter case, useful knowledge acquisition for firms may take a variety of forms, new 
knowledge creation being only one of them. Companies in the emerging economies may 
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successfully invest in their own research and development programmes, but may also gain 
from securing existing external knowledge via different channels. Accordingly, 
entrepreneurial identification of opportunities may come not from globally new, created, 
knowledge (innovation in the narrow sense of the term), but from bricolage: combining 
already existing knowledge in a selective way, to match local needs and conditions best. This 
acquired knowledge may for example take a form of licences; using information that has been 
already standardized and applied in mature market economies. Here, the gain in performance 
comes from managerial drive and the ability to identify, select, import and apply these 
elements of knowledge that fit local conditions.7 To summarize, we therefore propose that 
within emerging economy context, the focus should be on a wider process of knowledge 
acquisitions rather than only on innovations. Indeed, this is recognised in studies on 
innovation and related issues in emerging market contexts (Bhaumik & Zhou, 2014). 
Further, the translation of acquired new knowledge into (enhanced) firm performance 
may be adversely affected by "the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external 
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends" (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In 
addition, the absorptive capacity of a firm may be influenced by its governance structure 
(Filatotchev et al., 2003). In the context of emerging economies, a key distinction is between 
the governance structure of independent and group affiliated firms. Hierarchical 
organisational structures typical for business groups may lead managers to display lower 
strategic flexibility and affect their capacity to absorb new knowledge8 and to respond with 
                                                          
7
 Thus, considering the entrepreneurial use of knowledge in emHUJLQJPDUNHWVEULQJVXVFORVHUWR.LU]QHU¶V
stress on entrepreneurial "alertness to hitherto unnoticed opportunities" (Kirzner 1973, p. 39). This perspective 
highlights entrepreneurial uses of already existing resources, including the knowledge resources generated by 
others. Entrepreneurial firms in eastern emerging markets are not necessarily radical innovators; they are firms 
that are able to apply existing resources in a more effective way in a given local context. 
8
 $EVRUSWLYHFDSDFLW\UHODWHVWRWKHDELOLW\RIPDQDJHUVµµWRUHFRJQL]HWKHYDOXHRIQHZLQIRUPDWLRQDVVLPLODWH
LWDQGDSSO\LWWRFRPPHUFLDOHQGV¶¶&RKHQ	/HYLQWKDO 
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rapid adaptation. This problem will be exacerbated in the turbulent environments that typify 
emerging economies (Filatotchev, Isachenkova & Mickiewicz, 2007). 
Moreover, as business groups accumulate knowledge, they will seek to share this 
internally across their affiliates. This produces efficiency gains: group affiliated firms benefit 
from sharing tangible and intangible resources that can include technology and knowledge 
generated internally, or obtained from external sources (Chang & Hong, 2000). However, it 
also implies that investment in acquiring knowledge by managers of affiliate companies 
produce effects that are (partly) shared within the business group, i.e., the option value of 
knowledge acquisition is reduced because eventual payoffs are not proprietary. A 
combination of these two aspects implies that managers of the affiliates can to some extent 
free ride on a common pool of knowledge resources and has less motivation to make their 
own investment in acquisition. Correspondingly, consistent with Baumol (2010), we argue 
that there are limits to significant value enhancement from innovations within subsidiaries of 
large companies as compared with independent companies. Therefore, we hypothesize the 
following:       
Hypothesis 3: There will be a weaker positive link between managerial strategies to 
innovate, in the broad sense of accumulating knowledge, and firm performance for business 
group affiliates, compared with independent private companies, in emerging economies. 
 
EMPIRICAL COUNTERPART: VARIABLES AND METHODS 
Data 
 Our sample consists of 5,152 Indian firms across 70 industrial sectors (3-digit 
classification). The data are an unbalanced panel over the period 2001-2011 with 32,844 
firm-year observations. Our sample includes firms with four different types of ownership. 
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Private independent firms, which we use as the omitted or benchmark category in our 
empirical analysis, are privately owned firms that are not part of business groups. In addition, 
we have business group affiliated firms, state-owned firms, and foreign owned firms.  
Financial information about these companies, as well as information about ownership 
and industry affiliation, was obtained from the Prowess database provided by the Centre for 
Monitoring of the Indian Economy. Prowess is widely used for firm-level research on India; 
for example, Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) and Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007). 
The database includes information on both private and listed companies. 
As such, 2001 is a good starting point for the sample period as much of the reform 
associated with institutional development and, more importantly, credit and capital markets 
took place in India between 1994 and 2001 (Bhaumik & Dimova, 2004; Bhaumik, 
Gangopadhyay & Krishnan, 2009), even though some reforms can be traced back to the 
1980s (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2004). Hence, the period fits the nature of the broader 
research question about the efficacy of business groups in a reformed economic environment. 
Further, the period is long enough to include a cycle of high growth, followed by a slowdown 
and then recovery. Hence our estimates do not rely on a particular part of a business cycle. 
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Dependent variable 
 Our dependent variable to measure firm performance is profitability and we follow 
the literature (e.g. Miller & Breton-Miller, 2011) in the use of return on assets (ROA). Since 
profit after tax (PAT) is influenced by factors such as depreciation that are affected by 
accounting rules, and exogenous interest payments (see, e.g., Meeks, 1977), we follow 
convention and use profit before interest payments and taxes (PBIT) (e.g., Cuervo-Cazzura & 
Dau, 2009; Bhaumik & Selarka, 2012); accordingly, our measure of ROA is the ratio of PBIT 
to total assets. 
 
Independent variables 
Entrepreneurial orientation dimensions 
Consider first risk taking, which reflects a firm's propensity to make bold moves and to 
embrace uncertainty. If capital markets are relatively efficient, as in developed economies, 
then the idiosyncratic risk associated with these actions would be reflected in a firm's share 
price, such that the volatility of the share price can be used as the measure of risk taking 
(Fama, 1968). However, in emerging economies, capital market imperfections mean that 
observed share price volatility may be caused by factors other than managerial risk taking, for 
example, strikes and work stoppages, the loss of key managerial personnel and even localised 
natural disasters. The literature suggests that capital markets in India are not yet efficient 
(Sarkar & Mukhopadhyay, 2005), and hence the assumptions underlying the share price 
methodology for measuring risk are not met. Therefore, we instead focus on internal firm¶V 
indicators and we propose that in an emerging market, a firm's cash flow volatility over a 
period of time will reflect the risk that it undertakes strategically (Miller & Bromiley, 1990). 
Accordingly, we use the average volatility of cash flows for period t-5 to t-1 (i.e. the moving 
average) as the measure of risk taking for each period t (see Stein, Usher, LaGattuta & 
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Youngen, 2001). This accounting data based approach to measuring risk is also consistent 
with the relevant discussion in Miller and Le Breton Miller (2011). 
Next, a company is proactive if it actively engages in building the business and this is 
reflected in the use of its profits. Miller and Breton-Miller (2011) argue that proactiveness in 
developed economies can be measured by the percentage of profits reinvested in the company 
over a lengthy period of time. This is a better measure than current investment which is also 
affected by tactical responses to the current economic environment (Kaplan & Zingales, 
1997). The same logic holds for emerging markets, and is indeed perhaps strengthened by the 
relative paucity of alternative sources of finance. The use of a longer term measure is further 
motivated in emerging markets because in the short term cash flows may be affected by 
bottlenecks (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). We therefore measure the second pillar of EO, 
proactiveness, by the percentage of earnings retained by the firm (and hence available for 
reinvestment), taken as a moving average of the past five years. 
Turning to the third pillar, innovativeness, spending on research and development 
(R&D) is usually taken as the appropriate measure in developed market economies (e.g. 
Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011). As noted above, however, in an emerging market, the 
focus in terms of impact on firm performance should be on the wider process of knowledge-
acquisition.9 The latter might involve both the development of new products and process, and 
the adoption of technology, products and processes developed by other firms. Our measure of 
knowledge acquisition is therefore the sum of expenditures on internal R&D and those on 
externally sourced technologies (including licensing fees and royalty payments), divided by 
sales. As with the other two dimensions of EO, we use this as the moving average over the 
previous five years. However, given a large number of firms that had no investment in 
knowledge, this results in a highly skewed distribution. We therefore transform the variable 
                                                          
9
 Alternatively, we could use "information acquisition" if the emphasis was placed on tangible aspects 
(Mudambi and Navarra, 2004). "Knowledge" implies both tangible and intangible facets. 
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further into a dummy variable for which positive levels of investment in knowledge are 
denoted by unity. 
 
Ownership 
The Prowess database distinguishes between: (i) independent private domestic-owned 
firms that are unaffiliated with business groups, (ii) firms affiliated with domestic business 
group, (iii) state-owned firms, (iv) independent foreign firms, and (v) group affiliated foreign 
firms (e.g., Samsung). The distribution of these ownership groups is reported in Table 1. 
Business group-affiliated Indian companies (33%) and independent (unaffiliated) Indian 
companies (58%) are the largest categories. We also retain in our sample independent foreign 
firms (5%), group affiliated foreign firms (1%) and state-owned firms (3%) but exclude the 
other minor ownership categories.10 Our sample accounts for 99.85% of the 31,348 firm-
years for which data are available.11  
Our hypotheses concern how membership of business groups, moderates the impact of 
the different components of EO on firm performance. However,  we are also interested in the 
moderating effects of other ownership arrangements. To test all this, we interact each of the 
three dimensions of EO with the ownership categories noted above. The omitted category in 
our analysis is independent domestic (Indian) firms. Hence, the interactions are between the 
EO components and the dummy variables that account for group affiliated Indian firms, 
independent foreign firms, group affiliated foreign firms and state-owned firms. We shall 
discuss the implications of this for the regression estimates later in the paper. 
 
                                                          
10
  These are mixed state-private, cooperative, owned by non-residents, each of which account for too few firm-
years ± between 9 and 20 ± for meaningful comparison with the included ownership categories. 
11
 Robustness checks show that the results that are related to the hypotheses are unaffected by the inclusion of 
the firms of the three excluded ownership categories in the sample. 
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Control variables 
 We control for firm age and firm size, the proxy for the latter being (tangible) assets. In 
addition, to address the issues introduced by our measure of proactivity, we introduce a 
dummy variable corresponding to positive profits over the last five years12. We also control 
for the debt to equity ratio, which is an important determinant of agency costs (Jensen, 1986), 
and for direct ownership effects on performance. Further, we include year dummies to control 
for unobserved year-specific heterogeneity (11 dummies; 2001 is the omitted year) and 70 
three-digit sector dummy variables. Using the likelihood ratio tests, we verified that these are 
needed (both significant at 0.001 levels). 
The definitions of variables are presented in Table 1, and in Table 2 we report 
descriptive statistics and the correlations among the variables. Ignoring the obvious 
correlations, for example among the dummies that capture ownership categories, the 
correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables are typically below 0.1.  
 
{Tables 1 and 2} 
 
Model  
Our empirical model involves regressing firm profitability on risk taking, proactiveness 
and acquisition of knowledge,  their interactions with business groups affiliation (and other 
ownership categories), and a number of control variables. The latter include both time 
varying firm characteristics (firm age, firm size and leverage) and year- and industry- fixed 
effects. A dummy variable denoting positive profits was added to alleviate the potential bias 
                                                          
12
 It might seem more natural to use a measure like retained earnings over total earnings to measure 
proactivity. However, a large number of companies have either zero or negative total earnings Moreover, 
dropping those with negative earnings creates a selection bias problem. Therefore, we use a measure of 
retained earning normalized by total assets, and introduce this control for firms that have earnt positive 
profits. 
 
Page 22 of 57 
 
in proactiveness measure related to the fact that capacity to retain profits is conditional on 
profitability. Hence, the regression specification we use to test our hypotheses is given by:    
 
Profitabilityi, t  ȕ0 + ȕ1 × retained earningsi, t ȕ2 × cash volatilityi, t +  ȕ3 × knowledge 
acquisitioni, t +  ȕ4 × independent foreign firmi, t +  ȕ5 × affiliate domestic firmi, t + ȕ6 × 
affiliate foreign firmi, t + ȕ7 × state owned firmi, t + ȕ8 × retained earningsi, t × independent 
foreign firmi, t +  ȕ9 × retained earningsi, t × affiliate domestic firmi, t +  ȕ10 × retained 
earningsi, t × affiliate foreign firmi, t + ȕ11 × retained earningsi, t × state owned firmi, t ȕ12 × 
cash volatilityi, t ×  independent foreign firmi, t  ×  ȕ13 x cash volatilityi, t  × affiliate domestic 
firmi, t ȕ14 × cash volatilityi, t ×  affiliate foreign firmi, t ȕ15 × cash volatilityi, t ×  state 
owned firmi, t  ȕ16 × knowledge acquisitioni, t ×  independent foreign firmi, t  + ȕ17 × 
knowledge acquisitioni, t × affiliate domestic firmi, t  + ȕ18 × knowledge acquisitioni, t ×  
affiliate foreign firmi, t  + ȕ19 × knowledge acquisitioni, t × state owned firmi, t+ ȕ20 × asset size 
i, t +  ȕ21 × debt-equity ratioi, t +  ȕ21 ×positive profitsi, t +  year  t ī + sector j ǻ + firmi ǽ İi, t ,   
                                                                                                                                (1) 
 
where i, j, and t identify firms, industries, and years, respectively. ī denotes vector of 
coefficients on annual dummies, ǻ corresponds to coefficients on sectoral dummies, ǽ stands 
for firm-level random effects and finally İ represents the independent and identically 
distributed error term. We summarise our predictions in terms of the estimation model in 
Table 3. Note that the omitted ownership category in our regression model is independent 
private firms. Hence, the estimated coefficient of an EO component in the model effectively 
captures the EO-performance relationship for independent private firms, while the interaction 
terms involving ownership categories and EO components give us the moderating impact of 
business group affiliation and the other ownership types on the EO-performance relationship. 
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We estimate the regression model in equation (1) using random effects estimators. In 
unreported regressions (available from the authors on request), we also estimate 
corresponding fixed effects models, the disadvantage of which is that the time invariant 
ownership dummies (and industry affiliation of the firms) are now absorbed into the fixed 
effects. The random effects models are estimated using the maximum likelihood estimator 
and the fixed effects model applies the within regression estimator. 
 
{Table 3} 
 
RESULTS 
Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates of the random effects model in Columns (1), 
(2) and (3). In our baseline specification, Column (1), we estimate a truncated model 
including the EO components and control variables without any ownership terms. The 
ownership dummies and interactions between EO components and Indian business group 
affiliation are introduced in Column (2), and interactions with other ownership categories are 
added in Column (3).  
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects suggests that 
random and fixed effects estimators are more suitable for estimating the model than the 
ordinary least square estimator (e.g., based on specification (2) we obtain LR test statistic = 
4546, highly significant with a p-value of 0.001). Also, the likelihood-ratio test of a null 
hypothesis that the between-firms standard deviation of the random effect is zero is highly 
significant suggesting the validity of our choice of estimator. While we prefer the random 
effects estimator as it allows us to estimate interactions and direct ownership effects, 
reassuringly the regression estimates are robust across random and (unreported) fixed effects 
estimations with respect to all our hypotheses. For the three coefficients upon which our 
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hypothesis testing is based (see Table 3), the fixed effects models display the same pattern of 
both sign and statistical significance as random effects models.13  
 Based both on the estimates in Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4, we find support for 
Hypotheses (1) and (2), but not for Hypothesis (3). Thus the coefficient on the interactive 
term between business groups and risk taking is positive and significant (H1), and between 
business groups and proactivity is negative and significant (H2). However, the coefficient on 
the interaction between business groups and innovation is not statistically significant (H3). 
We discuss the implications of our regression estimates for the hypotheses in greater detail in 
the next section. 
We plot Figures 1 and 2 (based on the estimates of Column 3) to further analyse the 
differences between the EO-performance relationship between business group affiliates and 
independent firms that are significant (i.e. corresponding to Hypotheses (1) and (2)). The 
figures present the marginal effects on profitability of changes in our risk measure (Figure 1) 
and of changes in retained earnings (Figure 2). These marginal effects are generated for all 
the five ownership categories separately, represented by five lines on the graphs 
correspondingly. The range of these EO components lie between one standard deviation 
below their respective mean values to one standard deviation above these mean values, and 
the values of all other explanatory variables are held at their average values. We have 
integrated the interpretation of these figures with the discussion of the regression estimates 
and of the implications for the hypotheses below. 
 
{Table 4; Figures 1-2} 
 
                                                          
13
 The magnitude of effects is sometimes attenuated in the fixed effects models (results available on request). 
We report differences in the text. 
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DISCUSSION 
Profitability, risk taking and group ownership  
We predicted that business group affiliated firms will be able to manage risks using 
internal capital markets, so that they would be more successful at translating risk taking into 
profits than their independent counterparts. Within the regression framework, H1 implies that 
the sign on the interaction between cash flow volatility and the Indian group affiliation 
dummy variable will be positive and statistically significant in Columns 2 and 3. The results 
indicate that there is support for H1. The coefficient of the interaction between cash flow 
volatility and the dummy for business group affiliation is positive at 0.07 and highly 
significant in Column 2; when all other ownership effects are added, it reduces to 0.03 in 
Column 3 though with lower significance (it is 0.04 in the fixed effects estimation, significant 
at the 5% level).  
The regression results permit us to calculate the corresponding estimates of the impact 
of the risk taking component of EO on the profitability of independent Indian private firms 
and of group affiliated firms. Since the omitted ownership category in our regression 
Columns 2 and 3 is private independent Indian firms, the coefficient of the cash flow 
volatility variable itself measures the impact of risk taking on the profitability of independent 
domestic firms. The estimates (in Columns 2 and 3) are -0.07 and -0.03 correspondingly, both 
highly significant. By contrast, the overall impact of risk taking on the profitability of group 
affiliated firms is around zero; the negative coefficient of cash flow volatility for both of 
these models is exactly offset by the positive coefficient of the interaction between cash flow 
volatility and the dummy variable for group affiliated firms. These effects correspond to the 
slopes of the lines presented at Figure 1: the slope for the Indian business group affiliates is 
close to zero, yet it is negative for domestic independent firms. On the left hand side of 
Figure 1, with no risk taking, there is also no difference in predicted profitability levels 
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between the business group affiliated and independent Indian firms. On the right hand side 
however, with considerable risk taking, the results diverge: the profitability of business 
groups affiliates remain at the same level, but decreases for independent Indian 
companies14.We therefore find evidence for the mutual insurance effect identified in our 
theoretical framework; risk taking has a smaller negative impact on the performance of group 
affiliated firms, compared to the effect on the performance of private independent firms.  
 
  
 
Profitability, proactiveness and ownership types 
We predicted in Hypothesis 2 that the positive impact of retained earnings on 
profitability will be weaker for business group affiliated firms than for private independent 
firms. This implies that the sign on the interaction between this and the group affiliation 
dummy variable would be negative and statistically significant in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 
4. The coefficients of the interaction between retained earnings and the group affiliation 
dummy are negative ± between -0.06 and -0.09 for the random effects Columns 2-3 (and -
0.06 for the fixed effects model) ± and in all cases highly significant at the 1Å level, 
consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
As before, the coefficient of the retained earnings variable itself gives us the impact of 
proactiveness on the profitability of private independent firms in Columns 2 and 3 while the 
interaction between retained earnings and the dummy for business group affiliation gives us 
the moderating effect of group affiliation on the relationship between proactivity and 
profitability. For example, in Column 2, this implies that the impact of proactiveness on firm 
performance is weaker for group affiliated firms (0.11 = 0.20 - 0.09) than for the private 
                                                          
14
 These results are sharper for the fixed effects estimator; the impact of risk taking on the profitability of 
domestic group affiliates is positive, as against nearly zero for independent private firms. 
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independent firms (0.20). This corresponds to the steeper positive slope for independent 
domestic firms compared with domestic group affiliates depicted in Figure 2. Exactly the 
same difference between the impact of proactiveness on profitability in group affiliated (0.11 
= 0.17 - 0.06) and private independent firms (0.15) is also reflected by estimates presented in 
Column 3.15  As predicted, therefore, group affiliated firms are less able to translate the 
proactive strategy of retaining earnings (presumably for future investments) into profits than 
their private independent counterparts. 
 
Firm performance, knowledge acquisition and group ownership  
In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that knowledge acquisition will have less of an impact on 
the profitability of group affiliated firms than private independent firms. Within the 
regression framework, the hypothesis implies that the sign on the interaction between 
knowledge acquisition and the Indian group affiliation dummy variable will be negative and 
statistically significant in Columns 2 and 3. Our results support the idea that knowledge 
acquisition as such has a positive impact on performance (the coefficient in Column 1 is 
highly significant at the Å OHYHO +RZHYHU, the coefficients of the interaction between 
knowledge acquisition and the dummy variable for domestic group affiliated firms in models 
2 and 3 are statistically insignificant. In other words, while knowledge acquisition has a 
positive effect on performance of both private independent firms (0.79, in column (3)) and 
business group affiliated firms, there is no statistically significant difference between the 
knowledge acquisition-performance relationship between these types of firms. Our findings 
therefore do not provide support for Hypothesis 3. Since the difference between the 
knowledge acquisition-performance relationship for business group affiliates and private 
                                                          
15
 In the fixed effect model corresponding to Column 2, both the effects and the difference were slightly 
attenuated, but nevertheless remained highly significant (0.04 = 0.10 ± 0.06, correspondingly). 
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independent firms is statistically insignificant, we do not provide a graphical analysis of this 
result. 
 
Profitability, EO strategies and other ownership types   
Our results also offer interesting insights about the moderating effects of  wnership type on 
the relationship between the dimensions of EO and profitability for firms with other 
ownership structures. The results in Column 1 of Table 4 suggest that both independent and 
group-affiliated foreign firms perform better than any category of domestic Indian firms, 
which is broadly consistent with the existing literature (Chibber and Majumdar, 1999; 
Douma, George and Kabir, 2006). At the same time, state-owned enterprises do not perform 
as well as private independent firms. This is consistent with both the general and India-
specific literature that compares performance of state-owned and private enterprises (Chibber 
and Majumdar, 1998; Goldeng, Grunfeld and Benito, 2008; Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda, and 
Svejnar, 2009; Driffield, Mickiewicz and Temouri, 2013). 
We now turn to the impact of the moderating impact of foreign and state ownership on 
the relationship between risk taking and profitability. As illustrated by Figure 1, our results 
suggest that risk taking is associated with much bigger drop in the profits of independent 
foreign firms than for independent domestic firms. At the same time, the moderating impact 
is insignificant though positive for the handful of group affiliated foreign firms in our sample. 
This is consistent with the wider literature on liability of foreignness and institutional 
distance (Zaheer, 1995; Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Eden and Miller, 2004), one of whose 
implications is that foreign firms may find it difficult to devise and/or implement strategies 
that are optimal for the host country context. An interesting contribution we make however is 
that there is a clear contrast between independent and multinational-affiliated foreign firms ± 
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it is exactly the same contrast that we have identified between the independent and group 
affiliated Indian firms.  
Risk taking is also detrimental for the profitability of state-owned enterprises, although 
not nearly as much as for independent foreign firms. This could be on account of the well-
understood multiplicity of strategic objectives of state-owned enterprises, whose management 
have continually to strike a balance between business and political objectives (Zif, 1981; Bai 
and Xu, 2005; Estrin et al., 2009; Driffield et al., 2013). Other explanations include the moral 
hazard problems caused by soft budget constraints, the weak contractual incentives and 
managerial capacity, especially in managing projects associated with risk taking behaviour 
(Shirley and Xu, 1998; Kornai, Mishkin and Roland, 2003; Driffield et al., 2013).  
Next, we turn to the impact of foreign and state ownership of firms on the relationship 
between proactiveness and firm performance. Our results suggest that for both government-
held and foreign firms, proactiveness results in better firm performance relative to both 
independent private domestic and business group affiliated domestic firms; see Figure 2. Our 
speculative interpretation of this result is as follows. Proactiveness for both types of firms 
may reflect their autonomy and managerial capacity more than their business strategy. The 
ability of a state-owned enterprise to retain a proportion of its profits for future investment, 
UDWKHUWKDQUHWXUQWKHSURILWVWRWKHJRYHUQPHQWWRKHOSPLWLJDWHWKHODWWHU¶VEXGget deficits or 
to facilitate its investment in projects that have political priority, can be interpreted as 
functional autonomy that can result in better internal governance and an increase in the 
ZRUNHUV¶LQFHQWLYHWRZRUNLQWKHLQWHUHVWRIWKHILUP*URYHV+RQJ0F0LOODn and 
Naughton, 1994; Aivazian, Ge and Qiu, 2005). ,QWKHVDPHYHLQDIRUHLJQILUP¶VDELOLW\WR
retain a share of its profits, rather than to transfer it to the parent multinational enterprise, 
may reflect a desirable characteristic of a multinational entHUSULVH¶VJOREDOQHWZRUN
Page 30 of 57 
 
(Birkinshaw, Hood and Jonsson, 1998). In both cases, the ILUP¶VDELOLW\WREHSURDFWLYHPD\
also reflect recognition of the managerial capacity by the owner.  
For knowledge acquisition, there is little to add to the previous weak findings, except 
for a (marginally significant) premium for private foreign compared with private Indian 
firms.  
 
Other controls 
Finally, the coefficients in Columns 1 - 3 suggest that older firms are more profitable, 
which is consistent with the institutional void perspective; there is a premium to experience16. 
There are no significant effects related to debt-equity ratio and to the size of company as 
measured by tangible assets. The control variable for our measure of proactivity, representing 
positive profits in the past, is as expected positive and highly significant. The industry and 
time dummies are both jointly significant.17 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our research is motivated by the observation that fast growing firms from emerging 
economies have made rapid inroads into the global market place over the last two decades, 
and are challenging the hegemony of firms from the developed countries. The ability of these 
emerging market firms to sustain the competitive pressure on their developed economy 
                                                          
16
 This result is even stronger in the fixed effects model.   
17
 This implies that there was considerable variation in corporate profitability both between industries. Available 
evidence suggests that there was indeed significant variation in profitability across Indian industries, at least 
during the 1996-2007 period and that firm level profitability was indeed significantly correlated with sector-
wide profitability (Mody, Nath and Walton, 2010). Our result is also consistent with data available from 
https://data.gov.in/ which indicates that there was considerable variation in inter-industry and inter-year growth 
of the industrial sector during the 2005-06 to 2010-11 time period.  
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counterparts is dependent on their ability to successfully adopt entrepreneurial strategies, and 
to translate these strategies into performance. We posit however that this ability is mitigated 
by the organisational structures these ventures are led to adopt by the institutional contexts in 
which they operate.  
The emerging economies are characterised by weak institutions, and managers in these 
countries may respond to these weaknesses by adopting strategies that build on the 
comparative advantages of ownership structures of their businesses. In particular, 
membership of business groups may protect the affiliates against external risks but that this 
comes at the cost of some inefficiency in the allocation of financial resources and moral 
hazard among managers of individual member firms. Business group membership makes 
taking risks a more effective managerial strategy by providing mutual insurance and access to 
capital. On the other hand, internal redistribution acts as a disincentive on managers by 
breaking the link between profits and performance. We have separated the discussion of these 
two effects because they are not a simple trade-off. For some managers, the crucial 
opportunity may be risk taking; for others, the capacity to pursue investment opportunities 
may prove decisive. We operationalise this heterogeneity in the way mutual insurance affects 
business group affiliated firm managers by using the EO construct that separately account for 
risk taking and proactiveness attributes of firm management.  
Our results highlight the presence of this trade-off in India, a fast growing emerging 
market that is the home of many of the companies that are now competing successfully on 
global markets. The results indicate that business group affiliation is beneficial for companies 
that want to take on risk; in contrast, risk taking has a negative impact on firm profitability 
for private independent firms. However, these insurance benefits of business group 
membership may come at the cost of reducing returns to investment. The returns to proactive 
strategies have been found to be positive in India, as developed market economies (Miller, 
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1983). However, these returns increase at lower rate for business groups affiliates than for 
independent companies. 
The net impact of these two opposing effects of business group membership (risk 
taking and proactiveness) is difficult to predict, but the literature provides some indications 
about the overall outcome. It has been argued, for example, that risk taking by firms is 
positively correlated with the quality of investor protection in a country (John, Litov & 
Yeung, 2008). At the same time, family ownership, which significantly overlaps with 
business group structures in emerging economies, promotes entrepreneurial risk taking, but 
this effect is considerably weakened or even reversed if CEO-founders have long tenure 
(Zahra, 2005), which also characterises business groups in contexts such as India. Reluctance 
of business groups (and family firms) to engage in outward investment is also observed 
(Bhaumik, Driffield & Pal, 2010). In other words, risk taking may not be the strongest aspect 
of entrepreneurial orientation of emerging economy firms, thereby reducing the importance 
of the insurance role played by business groups. Indeed, business group membership might 
be more of a hedge against unanticipated shocks or poor performance in general, than an 
insurance to supplement strategic risk taking. By contrast, the ability of business group 
affiliated firms to make significant investments by tapping internal capital markets provides 
them with a significant advantage over competitors, and yet this advantage does not seem to 
yield much dividend for business group firms in terms of profitability. 
We also found that that knowledge acquisition, itself a broader concept than the notion 
of innovation used in the traditional EO literature, significantly affects firm performance in 
emerging economies. We obtained significant estimates of the positive impact of knowledge 
acquisition in both independent private firms and business group affiliated firms, but there is 
no difference in the knowledge acquisition-performance relationship of these two types of 
firms. We can infer from this that the advantages of business groups with respect to the 
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ability to share knowledge within business groups (Chang & Hong, 2000) is more than offset 
by factors such as hierarchical governance structures (Filatotchev et al., 2007) and moral 
hazard.18 While the positive impact of knowledge acquisition on performance bodes well for 
Indian (and, by extension, emerging market) firms, the statistically non-significant difference 
in this relationship between independent private firms and business group affiliated firms, 
despite their internal market for knowledge, managerial capabilities etc, raises questions 
about their efficacy in the changing business environment in emerging market economies. 
There is a need for further research into this important question. 
Taken together, the implication of our results is that business group affiliated firms are 
not able to develop an edge from the use of knowledge, in a sense of transforming it into 
better performance. At the same time, the insurance advantages of business group affiliations 
may be weak, and hence may be more than offset by inefficient use of within-group financial 
resources. An interpretation of these results is that, while the importance of the challenges 
posed by competition from emerging economy firms, many of which are affiliated to business 
groups, cannot be understated, our results suggest that these business groups continue to have 
some weaknesses that might provide their developed economy competitors a window of 
opportunity to sustain their traditional competitive edge. More importantly, for the purpose of 
our and future research, there is little to suggest that business group affiliation moderate the 
relationship between EO components and firm performance in a way that justifies their 
continued existence in the changing emerging market business environments. 
  
Limitations 
We follow Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2011) in utilising accounting data to capture 
the three pillars of entrepreneurial orientation, but in an emerging market context. This 
                                                          
18
 These arguments apply even more strongly to state-owned firms. 
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enables us to use for our analysis data that are objective in nature, and are therefore not 
vulnerable to different types of bias that are often found in subjective responses to survey 
data (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; Beegle, Himelin & Ravallion, 2009). However, this 
approach also prevents us from investigating empirically additional dimensions that could 
only be introduced by using surveys. In particular, our approach allows us to have ex post 
measures of the EO components rather than ex ante measures. For example, we can measure 
the outcome of risk taking, namely, cash flow variability, but not the act of risk taking itself. 
In such cases, refined survey instruments that supplement accounting data can be of help: 
using both at the same time is a promising idea for any follow up to our study. Furthermore, 
we did not discuss how internal rewards systems and other organisational improvements may 
mitigate some of the negative effects we identified and there is need for further research in tis 
area.  
Our results suggest that the link between knowledge acquisition and performance is 
weaker for business group affiliated firms. At the same time, these firms may enjoy the 
advantages associated with sharing knowledge (or more broadly: tangible and intangible 
resources) internally with other firms associated with the business group (Chang & Hong, 
7KHLPSDFWRINQRZOHGJHDFTXLVLWLRQRQSHUIRUPDQFHZLOOGHSHQGRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶V
absorptive capacity (Tsai, 2001) as firms need to assimilate (analyse, process, interpret and 
understand) the information obtained from external sources (Zahra & George, 2002). This is 
an important dimension that we cannot observe in our data, yet the one that could explain the 
heterogeneity within business group affiliates. More data and more research are needed to 
explore this further. 
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We also focus only on India, which, while very large, may have specific features 
limiting the generalizability of our findings (see also: Chang et al., 2006). There are many 
common features of emerging economies, but also some important elements of heterogeneity. 
In particular, the pattern of corporate growth in India, which, as in much of Asia, is driven by 
both independent firms and business groups, is likely to differ from that of China, where 
state-owned companies or partly privatised companies play an important role (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2014). It might nevertheless be possible to argue that the basic 
trade-off on which we focus, between the greater ability to take risk on account of de facto 
risk underwriting by an entity larger than the firm and the ability of the firm to use internal 
resources efficiently, remains applicable for China as well. 
 
Implications for managerial practice  
We have addressed questions about how performance is affected by entrepreneurial 
orientation in different types of companies. Managers typically take the core ownership 
features of their companies as given, and then shape the strategies their firms adopt. Thus, it 
is important to ask how the effectiveness of a fundamental strategic dimension, such as taking 
risks to innovate, or aggressive accumulation of resources and its investment, impacts on firm 
performance in emerging economies, and how the results differ conditional on both group 
affiliation and on the market environment within which the firm operates. Our results suggest 
that managers of business group affiliates should utilize the competitive advantage that the 
governance structure offers by engaging in entrepreneurial risk taking. The head offices of 
business groups should also explore how to ameliorate the weakening of incentives to 
managers who are proactive or innovative. In contrast, proactiveness based on retained 
earnings, investment and knowledge acquisition is always at the core of successful 
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entrepreneurial orientation of independent companies. It is for this group of companies that 
we found evidence that spending on knowledge acquisition results in better performance. 
This result should not be read as suggesting that innovativeness and quest for knowledge is 
not important in the context of emerging economies, but that absorption and utilization of 
knowledge within emerging market group-affiliated firms exhibit significant variation, and 
therefore could be an important issue to explore further. 
Our study has made important contributions to the theory of entrepreneurial orientation 
and business performance in emerging economies, by expanding our understanding of the 
specific dimensions upon which EO may be enhanced and where it may be inhibited.  
Specifically, we show that risk taking may actually undermine rather than improve business 
performance for some types of firms in emerging economies. Similarly, it is usually argued 
that managers who follow intensive innovation based strategies in developed economies will 
enhance the performance of their companies. However, in emerging economies, firms can 
make significant market gains while still not operating as innovation leaders, as exemplified 
by the current case of Samsung competing successfully against Apple. Hence, bricolage ± 
combining existing knowledge to match specific needs and conditions ± may supplement 
innovation as the key driver of business performance in these business contexts. Relying 
more heavily on proactiveness, the third element of EO, may more than substitute for the 
weaker impact of innovativeness in emerging economies.  
When considering corporate strategies in emerging economy firms, one must also take 
into account the greater variety of ownership arrangements compared with developed 
economies, most significantly the widespread prevalence of business groups. We show how 
the impact of the three aspects of EO may be moderated in firms which are business group 
affiliates, in comparison with the independent private companies that make up the bulk of 
competitors in developed economies. In so doing, we are better able to understand the 
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potential longer-term performance implications of the business group corporate form for 
entrepreneurial strategies. Thus we find that business group affiliation provides benefits to 
emerging economy¶V firms that choose to take risks, relative to those that are unaffiliated, but 
simultaneously the returns to proactive strategies are weakened. Moreover, knowledge 
acquisition, itself a wider concept than innovation, does not significantly affect performance 
in emerging economy business group affiliated firms. Managers of business group affiliated 
companies from emerging economies should not concentrate on increasing spending on 
knowledge acquisition, but on learning how to make the process more effective, enhancing 
the absorptive capacity of their companies.  
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TABLE 1 
Variables and Measures 
     
Variable Measure Value Mean St. Dev. 
Profitability Profits before interests and taxes over total 
assets 
Continuous 4.99 17.38 
Independent 
Indian 
Private Indian-owned companies, unaffiliated 
with business groups 
1 or 0 0.57 0.49 
Independent 
Foreign 
Private foreign-owned companies, unaffiliated 1 or 0 0.05 0.22 
Group Affiliate 
Indian 
Private Indian group-affiliated companies 1 or 0 0.33 0.47 
Group Affiliate 
Foreign 
Private foreign-owned companies, affiliated 1 or 0 0.01 0.10 
State-owned Indian state owned companies 1 or 0 0.03 0.17 
Retained 
Earnings 
Retained earnings over total assets, 5-years 
moving average, lagged one year 
Continuous 0.09 19.66 
Cash Variability Standard deviation in cash flow over assets of 
last 5 years, lagged one year 
Continuous  9.93 22.48 
Knowledge 
acquisition 
Expenditure on research and development, 
royalty, licence and technical know-how and 
services fees, over total sales, divided by the 
sector mean (3-digit) of the same measure, 5-
years average, lagged one year, higher than 
zero. 
1 or 0 0.39 0.49 
Tangible assets Plant, machinery, computers and electrical 
installations (in Rs. Million) 
Continuous 2108.43 19779.13 
Age Age of the firm since year of establishment, 
mean-centred (at 28 years) 
Continuous 0 19.83 
Debt to equity Debt to equity ratio Continuous 3.38 x 1012 6.13x1014 
Positive profits Positive profits over the last five years 1 or 0 0.66 0.47 
Industry Indicator of the industry of the firm at the 3-
digit sectoral level (70 industries)  
1 or 0   
Year Indicator of the year (10 years: 2002-2011) 1 or 0   
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Profitability 5.30 17.22 1.00             
2. Independent Indian 0.57 0.50 -0.03 1.00            
3. Independent Foreign 0.05 0.22 0.05 -0.27 1.00           
4. Group Affiliate Indian 0.34 0.47 0.03 -0.82 -0.17 1.00          
5. Group Affiliate Foreign 0.01 0.10 0.04 -0.11 -0.02 -0.07 1.00         
6. State-owned 0.03 0.17 -0.06 -0.21 -0.04 -0.13 -0.02 1.00        
7. Retained earnings 0.28 17.70 0.38 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.10 1.00       
8. Cash flow variability 9.60 21.13 -0.13 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.00 0.08 -0.02 1.00      
9. Knowledge acquisition 0.72 0.45 -0.00 -0.06 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.00 0.01 1.00     
10. Tangible assets 2218 20,263 0.03 -0.10 -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.02 -0.02 0.02 1.00    
11. Age (mean centred) 0 19.90 0.04 -0.18 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.06 1.00   
12. Debt-to-equity ratio 1.15 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 1.00  
13. Positive profits (past) 0.89 0.32 0.11 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.29 0.01 -0.10 -0.00 1.00 
Notes:  
(i) Before mean-centring, the mean age is 28.5.  
(ii) The mean and standard deviation for debt-to-equity ratio reported above excludes 1% of extreme outliers at the upper end of its distribution. We run regressions with and 
without this correction. While results after the correction are marginally stronger, in Table 4 below we report more conservative estimates based on all available data. 
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TABLE 3 
Summary of Hypotheses to be tested 
 
EO component Hypotheses Empirical test 
Risk (cash flow variability) 
There will be a stronger 
positive link between risk 
taking and profitability for 
business group affiliates, 
compared with independent 
private companies, in 
emerging economies.  
H1ȕ13 > 0 
Pro-activeness (retained 
earnings) 
There will be a weaker positive 
link between retained earnings 
and profitability for business 
group affiliates, compared with  
independent private companies, 
in emerging economies. 
 
H2ȕ9 < 0 
Acquisition of knowledge 
There will be a weaker positive 
link between managerial 
strategies to innovate, in the 
broad sense of accumulating 
knowledge, and profitability for 
business group affiliates, 
compared with independent 
private companies, in emerging 
H3ȕ17 < 0 
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economies. 
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Table 4. Estimates of profits before taxes over assets 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Proactiveness (retained earnings / profits) 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Risk taking (cash flow variability) -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.03*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Knowledge acquisition / sales > 0 1.13*** 0.97** 0.79* 
 
(0.24) (0.30) (0.33) 
Tangible assets -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age of firm 0.02* 0.02** 0.02* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Private foreign 3.31*** 2.34** 3.80*** 
 
(0.80) (0.82) (1.14) 
Group Indian 0.96* -0.09 0.26 
 
(0.38) (0.45) (0.45) 
Group foreign 3.09+ 3.17+ 2.43 
 
(1.69) (1.69) (2.34) 
Government -5.23*** -5.19*** -3.67** 
 
(0.98) (1.00) (1.24) 
Private foreign x Proactiveness 
  
0.36*** 
   
(0.03) 
Group Indian x Proactiveness 
 
-0.09*** -0.06*** 
  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Group foreign x Proactiveness 
  
0.43*** 
   
(0.07) 
Government x Proactiveness 
  
0.00 
   
(0.01) 
Private foreign x Risk Taking 
  
-0.33*** 
   
(0.06) 
Group Indian  x Risk Taking 
 
0.07*** 0.03+ 
  
(0.01) (0.02) 
Group foreign x Risk Taking 
  
0.07 
   
(0.09) 
Government x Risk Taking 
  
-0.09*** 
   
(0.01) 
Private foreign x Knowledge 
  
1.84+ 
   
(1.05) 
Group Indian x Knowledge 
 
0.19 0.41 
  
(0.49) (0.51) 
Group foreign x Knowledge 
  
0.79 
   
(2.20) 
Government x Knowledge 
  
0.43 
   
(1.31) 
Debt to equity 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Positive profits,  past (dummy) 4.55*** 4.53*** 4.59*** 
 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Constant -0.00 -2.02 -2.49+ 
 
(0.36) (1.40) (1.37) 
sigma_u 10.57*** 10.36*** 10.06*** 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
sigma_e 12.59*** 12.58*** 12.56*** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
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Notes to Table 4: 
Observations:  32,844 in Model 1; 32,833 in Models 2 and 3 
Number of companies: 5,152 in Model 1, 5,150 in Models 2 and 3 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10    
Sectoral controls and years included    
Random effects maximum likelihood estimator    
Private Indian firm: omitted benchmark ownership category    
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FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 2 
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